

BOOK I

ITALY AND SPAIN

CHAPTER I

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

WHEN Caesar's dispatch reached the consuls, it was only Jan. 1, 49¹ the urgent representations of the tribunes that gained it a hearing by the House; the further request for a definite motion on its terms was refused, and the House passed, at the instance of the Government, to the general debate upon public affairs. Lucius Lentulus pledged his support to the Senate and Republic, provided members were ready to express themselves with boldness and determination; but any coquetting with Caesar or bidding for his favour, such as they had shown in previous years, would find him consulting his own interests without the slightest heed to their decrees. 'He, as well as they', he added significantly, 'had his line of retreat open to him in the favour and friendship of Caesar.' Scipio² spoke in similar terms. Pompeius was resolved to stand by the Republic if supported by the Senate; but let them hesitate or shrink from decided measures, and any subsequent appeal to his aid, should they afterwards desire it, would only be made in vain. This speech of Scipio's was² taken by the House as representing the actual language of

¹ Approximate only, owing to the state of the calendar, which was some five weeks ahead of the season. Any month and day given must be corrected accordingly. Thus Jan. 1, 49 becomes about Nov. 24, 50.

² Father-in-law of Pompeius since 52.

Jan. 49 Pompeius ; for, although they were met within the city walls, Pompeius was at the time in the neighbourhood of Rome.¹ Other and more conciliatory measures, it should be noticed, had been previously counselled by various members present. Marcus Marcellus, for example, in addressing the House had urged that it was premature to discuss the main issue till levies had been completed throughout Italy, and armies put into commission ; under whose protection they could then venture to formulate their wishes with liberty and security. Again, Marcus Calidius had a proposal that Pompeius should leave Italy and go off to his provinces², thereby removing all pretext for war ; since what Caesar feared was that the retention near the capital of the two legions lately extorted from him by the Senate should look like a deliberate menace from Pompeius to himself. This proposal of Calidius was repeated, with slight verbal changes, by Marcus Caelius Rufus.

They were one and all made the object of a savage attack by the presiding consul Lentulus, and effectually silenced by his scathing satire : in fact, he even went so far as to refuse to put the motion of Calidius ; whereupon Marcellus, alarmed at the growing storm of obloquy, withdrew that standing in his name. The result was that this language of the consul, backed up by the terrorizing effect of the presence of the army, together with the open threats of Pompeius's friends, succeeded in forcing the House, against the convictions of the majority, to adopt the motion of Scipio, whereby Caesar was to disband his army before a fixed date or be held guilty of open treason. This resolution being vetoed by two of the

¹ As holding full military command Pompeius could not, without forfeiting it, enter the ancient city boundary.

² The two Spains, then governed by his deputies. . See *Intro.*

tribunes, Marcus Antonius and Quintus Cassius, the legality Jan. 49 of such veto was immediately challenged¹. Extreme opinions were expressed, and the applause that greeted each speaker from the ranks of Caesar's opponents was in direct proportion to the bitter and vindictive spirit each displayed.

It was evening before the Senate broke up, and Pompeius³ at once summoned to a conference outside the city all who possessed a seat in the House, praising their recent action and stiffening them to face the future, while rebuking and stimulating the faint-hearted. From all parts of the country large numbers of those who had belonged to the old Pompeian armies were called out for active service, induced by hopes of plunder and high military rank; many also of those who were attached to the two legions lately transferred by Caesar now received orders to be in attendance; with the result that the city, the ascent to the Capitol, and the Comitium were soon crowded with regimental officers, centurions, and reservists. An overflowing meeting of the House was shortly afterwards held, packed with the friends of both consuls, and the supporters, not merely of Pompeius, but of all who nursed old grievances against Caesar; and these, by their threatening language and imposing numbers, intimidated the weak-kneed, strengthened the waverers, and made a free decision for most of those present impossible. An offer was made by Lucius Piso, one of the censors², and Lucius Roscius, one of the

¹ Apparently on the ground that the proceedings involved the appointment to consular provinces, which was exempt from the veto.

² A quinquennial office, lately fallen into abeyance. The two censors, when appointed, held the census, revised the senatorial register, and supervised Public Works.

Jan. 49 praetors,¹ to carry a report of these proceedings to Caesar, six days only being asked for the purpose : similarly others urged that a commission be sent to lay before him the mind of the House.

4 To all alike objection was raised, and all alike were thwarted by speeches from the consul, from Scipio, and from Cato. Cato's opposition was due to long-standing dislike of Caesar, increased by resentment at an electoral defeat. The action of the consul Lentulus was dictated by the colossal proportions of his debts, which he looked forward to settling by the command of an army and provinces, and by the princely profits to be made out of foreign king-making : indeed, he boasted in private that he would be a second Sulla, into whose hands the supreme government would one day fall. As for Scipio, his motives were similar ambitions for a province and armies, the command of which he thought he, as a relative, would share with Pompeius : to this must be added his fears of prosecution, and also the ostentatious flattery of which he was at this time the subject, not merely from himself, but from all his most powerful contemporaries in the political and legal worlds. Finally, in the case of Pompeius, the influence of Caesar's opponents along with his inability to tolerate a rival on equal terms, had induced him completely to withdraw his old friendship and to resume intimate relations with their common antagonists, whose enmity, in the majority of cases, he had himself fastened upon Caesar in the old days of their family alliance.² In addition to this, the public stigma

¹ Eight annual magistrates representing the Roman Bench, who could however command troops.

² In 59 after Caesar's consulship Pompeius had married his daughter Julia who died in childbirth in 54.

attaching to the affair of the two legions, which, instead of Jan. 49 marching for Asia Minor and Syria, had been diverted by him to secure his own sovereignty, drove him to work for a settlement by the sword.

It was such considerations that now caused everything to 5 be hurried through in disorder. The delay asked for by Caesar's friends, in order to acquaint him with these developments, was steadily refused; the two tribunes of the people were allowed no opportunity either of protesting against their personal peril, or even of maintaining, in the form of the veto, that fundamental right of their office which had been left them by Lucius Sulla. The seventh day of the New Year saw them compelled to take measures for their personal safety, such as, in the case of the notorious revolutionaries of the past, had generally been adopted as their hazardous refuge only after eight months spent in multifarious political activity. Such indecent haste, in fact, was now displayed, that without more ado recourse was had to the very last weapon of Senatorial government,—the well-known 'final decree',—which no amount of effrontery in popular legislators had ever before brought to a division in the House, unless indeed Rome were all but burning, and the very existence of the country despaired of,—the decree directing consuls, praetors, tribunes, and all proconsuls near the capital to take measures for the safety of the State. This order was embodied in a decree of the House dated January 7: and thus within the first five days on which the Senate could legally be convened since Lentulus entered upon office (not reckoning the two days set down for comitial business), a decision was arrived at of extreme severity and malignity both on the question of Caesar's military command, and on the fate of two distin-

Jan. 49 guished tribunes of the people. The latter at once left Rome and fled to Caesar, who was then at Ravenna, awaiting an answer to his very moderate demands, and still hoping that men's general sense of fairness would render a peaceful solution possible.

6 The next few days the Senate met outside the city boundary. The conduct of Pompeius tallied with the forecast given of it by Scipio. After commending the courage and firmness that the Senators had just displayed, he proceeded to lay before them an account of the military forces at his disposal, which were not less, he declared, than ten fully mobilized Roman legions. To this was added the statement that he had trustworthy intelligence that Caesar's troops looked coldly on his schemes, and could neither be induced to support his cause, nor to follow his leadership. Motions were then put before the House dealing with other requisite measures. It was proposed that enlisting should be organized throughout Italy; that Faustus Sulla should be dispatched without delay to Morocco (*Mauretania*); and lastly, that Pompeius should be supplied with money from the Treasury. The question was also raised of making an alliance of friendship with King Juba,¹ but the consul Marcellus refused for the present to entertain this idea; whilst the proposal concerning Faustus was vetoed by Philippus, one of the tribunes. The rest were duly embodied in regular decrees. It was further determined to give commands of provinces to men not then in office, two of these to be consular and the rest praetorian. Of the former Syria fell to Scipio, Gaul to Lucius Domitius. By a clandestine arrangement Philippus and Cotta were

¹ Of *Numidia* (Algeria). See Bk. II, ch. 3.

passed over, neither of their lots being thrown in. To the Jan. 49 remaining provinces ex-praetors were sent out; and these, without waiting for the legal confirmation of their command by the people, after offering the customary state-prayers, immediately left the capital in full military attire. The consuls, acting against all precedent, took their departure from the city, whilst inside and on the Capitol lictors were seen in attendance on men no longer in office, a sight unexampled in the history of the commonwealth. Over the whole of Italy troops were being enlisted, arms commandeered, money levied on the country towns and even plundered from the temples; in short, every distinction between the claims of the State and of religion was obliterated.

Caesar no sooner had intelligence of these proceedings 7 than he appealed to his troops. After recounting in detail the wrongs he had suffered at the hands of his political opponents, he charged Pompeius with having allowed his mind to be misled, and his judgement to be warped by the pernicious influence these exerted upon him, owing to the petty jealousy he felt at his rival's reputation; and that, despite the fact that that rival had himself always actively supported the power and prestige of Pompeius. A further grievance was the establishment of an unwarrantable precedent in the constitution, when military force was invoked to annul and to override the tribunes' power of veto—that same veto which in past years had only been restored by a similar appeal to force. Even Sulla, who stripped the tribunician office of all its functions, yet left it the free exercise of the veto; Pompeius, who was regarded as the restorer of their lost privileges, had actually succeeded in robbing them of what they had always enjoyed. Again, on every occasion when the well-known

Jan. 49 decree had been passed for the magistrates 'to see to it that the country take no harm'—the statutory formula for summoning the Roman people to arms—it had been at a time either of the promulgation of some obnoxious legislation, of some violence offered by a tribune, or of some popular disturbance; and then only after the temples and city heights had already been seized. How such revolutionary attempts in past history had been avenged by the downfall of Saturninus and the Gracchi, he next reminded them. Yet of these circumstances not one had at this time arisen or been even thought of: no law had been promulgated, no popular legislation proposed, no disturbance taken place. He called upon them now to protect from political adversaries the honour and good name of their commander, under whose leadership for nine long years they had fought with such brilliant success the battles of their country, during which time they had gained such numberless victories, and subjugated the whole of Gaul and Germany.¹

The men of the Thirteenth legion, the only one present, answered with a cheer (Caesar had summoned this regiment to him when the general levy in Italy began; the concentration of the others was not yet completed), 'they were ready to protect the rights of their commander and of the people's tribunes'

8 Assured of the temper of his troops, Caesar began his advance with this legion as far as Rimini (*Ariminum*)², where he

¹ i. e. W. of the Rhine.

² Thereby crossing the Rubicon, the small stream that then separated Italy from the Cisalpine Province. 'We can still go back', are the words attributed to him by later writers, 'but once cross this little bridge, and then the sword must settle everything.' Suet. 31.

met the two tribunes who had lately fled to his protection : Jan. 49 his remaining legions he ordered out of their winter quarters with instructions to follow close in his rear. At Rimini he was waited on by young Lucius Caesar, a son of one of his own generals. This young man, after first stating the primary object of his mission, went on to explain that he had a private message from Pompeius to Caesar on the subject of their personal relations. This was to the effect that 'Pompeius desired to clear himself in Caesar's eyes, so that the latter should not take as an insult to himself what had solely been dictated by public exigencies ; that he had always regarded the claims of public interests as prior to those of private friendship, and that Caesar similarly should now show his true greatness by sacrificing ambition and passion to the general good, and not allow resentment against opponents to go so far as to involve his country in the punishment he hoped to inflict upon them'. There was more in the same strain along with excuses for the conduct of Pompeius ; and a very similar appeal, in similar language, was made to Caesar by the praetor Roscius, who stated that he had it from Pompeius.

Now, although this episode had apparently but little bearing on the removal of his own grievances, yet, finding appropriate agents at hand for conveying his wishes to Pompeius, Caesar begged each of them that, as they had brought him Pompeius's terms, so they would not object to taking back his own demands to Pompeius. It was surely worth while to go to a little trouble, if by this means a great quarrel could be settled and the whole of Italy thus freed from apprehension. 'Let them then understand that with him honour had always been first,—dearer than life itself. This honour had been wounded when the privilege granted him by the

Jan. 49 people of Rome had been floutingly snatched from him by opponents, and when, after being robbed of six months' command, he found himself, as he now did, dragged back to the capital, in spite of the fact that a resolution allowing his candidature at the approaching elections to be accepted in his absence had been expressly passed by the sovereign people.¹ Though, however, he had borne without complaint, for the sake of public peace, this curtailment of his rights, yet his own modest suggestion for a general disarmament, which he made in a dispatch to the Senate, had been bluntly refused: levies were even now proceeding throughout Italy; whilst the two legions which had been detached from his command on the pretext of a Parthian war, were still detained at home: in short, the whole country was in arms. What did all this point to except his own destruction? Still, he was ready to stoop to every humiliation and to endure every injustice, if thereby he could save the commonwealth. Accordingly, these were his terms: Pompeius to take his departure to his own provinces, and both to disband their armies simultaneously with a general disarmament in Italy. That would allay the apprehension of the country, and enable elections and the whole machinery of government to be carried on by both Senate and people without coercion. Lastly, in order to facilitate the settlement by giving it fixed terms and the sanction of their sworn oath, he proposed that either Pompeius should advance to meet him, or else allow a visit from himself; for he felt confident that by talking matters
10 over all differences could be adjusted.' With this message Roscius and Lucius Caesar came to Capua, where they found the consuls and Pompeius, to whom they delivered Caesar's

¹ See Introd.

stipulations. After due deliberation an answer was returned Jan.-Feb. 49 by the same messengers, who thereupon brought back the written demands the other side had to make, of which the following represents the summary: 'Caesar must recross the Rubicon, evacuate Rimini, and disband his army; after that, Pompeius would go to his Spanish provinces. Meanwhile, until a pledge had been given that Caesar would keep his word, the consuls and Pompeius would continue to raise troops.'

It was obviously a one-sided bargain to require Caesar to 11 evacuate Rimini and retire upon his province, whilst his opponent kept both provinces and legions alike to which he had no claim: to propose that Caesar's army should be disbanded, while yet proceeding with his own levy: or again, to undertake to go to his province, without, however, fixing a date for his departure. The consequence of this last provision would have been that, supposing at the close of Caesar's consulship Pompeius had not yet left Rome, he could not justly be held guilty of any breach of faith by this refusal to quit the capital. Finally, his omission to arrange an interview or to promise any visit could but reduce the chances of peace to a minimum. Accordingly Caesar dispatched Marcus Antonius with a force of five battalions to seize Arrezo (*Arretium*), whilst he himself remained with two more at Rimini, where the raising of fresh troops was forthwith commenced. At the same time, with the three remaining battalions of his single legion he occupied the coast towns of Pesaro (*Pisaurum*), Fano (*Fanum*), and Ancona.

During these same few days intelligence reached him 12 that the praetor Thermus, with a force of five battalions was at Gubbio (*Iguvium*), engaged in fortifying the town, the inhabitants of which were all strongly disposed towards him-

Jan.-Feb. 49 self. Under the command therefore of Curio the three battalions stationed at Pesaro and Rimini were at once ordered to the place. On hearing of their approach Thermus, who felt no confidence in the temper of the town, hastily withdrew his garrison ; but his men deserted on the march to return to their homes, and Curio was then left to receive an enthusiastic reception into Gubbio.

The report of these proceedings determined Caesar to trust the adhesion of the country boroughs, and, by withdrawing the battalions of the Thirteenth legion then garrisoning them, to march upon Osimo (*Auximum*). This town was then held by Attius, who, after throwing a few battalions into it as a garrison, was now engaged in raising troops throughout the whole of Piceno (*Picenum*) with the help of a number of senators who were traversing the country for that purpose.

13 On the news of Caesar's advance, however, the town councillors of Osimo waited in a body upon Attius Varus, and informed him that, without constituting themselves judges in the present quarrel, neither they nor the rest of the town were prepared to see a general like Caius Caesar, whose public services had been so signal, refused admission within their walls ; and that he would therefore do well to consult his future interests. This language led Varus to make a precipitate withdrawal of the garrison he had established in the town ; but, overtaken by a small knot of infantry from Caesar's advanced companies and compelled to give battle, he found himself deserted by his troops, who either dispersed to their homes or went over to Caesar. Amongst them was Lucius Pupius, the senior centurion of his legion, who had formerly held that post in the army of Pompeius, and who was now brought by his men as a prisoner to Caesar. The latter,

after congratulating Attius's troops upon their decision, dismissed Pupius, and, in thanking the townspeople of Osimo, told them he would not forget their conduct. Feb. 49

Meanwhile, in Rome, such a panic arose from the accounts¹⁴ of these operations, that the consul Lentulus, who had gone to open the treasury for the purpose of disbursing the money voted by the Senate to Pompeius, fled incontinently from the city, leaving the more sacred of the two treasuries¹ wide open, owing to a false alarm that Caesar was momentarily expected, and his cavalry already at the gates. He was at once followed by his colleague Marcellus, and by the majority of the other magistrates. Pompeius had left the capital the day before, and was now on his way to the two legions taken from Caesar, which he had distributed in winter quarters in Apulia. All levying of troops was at once suspended in the vicinity of the city; no place was thought safe north of Capua. Here, with their confidence at last recovered, they rallied, and began to organize a levy among the farmers lately settled as colonists in that district by the Julian law;² and the consul Lentulus even went so far as to take the band of gladiators maintained there by Caesar, and bring them out into the market-place, where, after inciting their hopes by the prospect of earning their liberty, he gave them horses and placed them under his orders. A subsequent hint, however, from his friends that this proceeding was universally condemned, compelled him to distribute them for custody amongst his acquaintances in the Capuan district.

Meanwhile Caesar, advancing from Osimo (*Auximum*),¹⁵

¹ Containing a special war reserve, originally designed to meet a Gallic invasion.

² One of Caesar's laws, 59.

Feb. 49 overran the whole of the Marches of Piceno (*Picenum*). He was received with open arms by all the country towns, who readily supplied his army with all it needed. Even Cingolo (*Cingulum*), a town founded by Labienus¹, and built at his personal charges, sent a deputation to inform him what great pleasure it would give them to receive his commands; and on his ordering troops, sent them at once. By this time also the Twelfth legion overtook him; and with these two he now advanced against Ascoli Piceno (*Asculum Picenum*). That town was held by a force of ten battalions under Lentulus Spinther; but, on the news of Caesar's approach, Spinther evacuated the place, and endeavoured to take his battalions with him. Deserted, however, by the larger number, he continued his march with a mere handful, until he fell in with Vibullius Rufus, who had lately come with a special commission from Pompeius to strengthen the hands of his party in the Picenian lowlands. Vibullius, on hearing from Spinther the state of operations in that quarter, took over the latter's troops, and dismissed their commander. He then proceeded to concentrate as many units as he could from the Pompeian levy in the surrounding districts, amongst which there joined him six battalions under Lucilius Hirrus, whom he met flying from Camerino (*Camerinum*) with what had formerly been the garrison of that city; and in this way he succeeded in making up as many as thirteen battalions. These he then led by forced marches to Domitius Ahenobarbus at Pentima (*Corfinium*)², to whom he announced the near approach of Caesar with two legions. Domitius himself,

¹ The distinguished general who had deserted Caesar. See *Intro.*

² Pentima on the upper Pescara is only approximately the site of the ancient Corfinium.

it should be added, had also collected a force of about twenty Feb. 49
battalions from Albe (*Alba*), drawn from the country of the
Marsi, Peligni, and neighbouring districts¹.

Continuing his advance, Caesar, after securing Fermo 16
(*Firmum*), and giving orders, upon the expulsion of Lentulus,
to search out the troops who had deserted that general, and
to organize a levy, had halted one day at Ascoli (*Asculum*) to
obtain supplies, and had then started for Pentima. Arrived
here, he found five battalions, thrown forward by Domitius
for that purpose, engaged in cutting the bridge that spans
the river² at a distance of some three miles from the city.
With this force Caesar's advanced patrols now came into
contact, with the result that Domitius's men were driven
from the bridge and retired upon the town. Caesar quickly
had his legions across, and, halting near the city, pitched his
camp close up to the walls.

On intelligence of his arrival, Domitius selected some of 17
those conversant with the country, and induced them, by
the offer of a large reward, to go with a letter to Pompeius
in Apulia, conveying a strongly-worded appeal for succour.
In it he declared his belief that with two armies, aided by
the natural difficulties of the country, it would be an easy
task to surround Caesar, and to sever his communications;
failing this, the lives of himself and more than thirty battalions
of men, as well as those of numerous senators and Roman
knights would be endangered. In the interval he encouraged
his own party, placed artillery on the walls, allotted each
officer his special duties in the defence, and, in a public
harangue to his troops, promised each man a farm of twenty-

¹ The Abruzzi.

² The Aterno or Pescara.

Feb. 49 five acres out of his own landed property, with corresponding increase in the case of centurions and reservists.

18 About this time Caesar received information that the people of Salmone (*Sulmo*), a town seven miles from Pentima, were anxious to side openly with him, but were prevented by Quintus Lucretius, a senator, and Attius the Pelignian, who were holding it with a force of seven battalions. Accordingly Marcus Antonius was dispatched to the place with five battalions of the Thirteenth legion; with the result that the townspeople no sooner recognized the gleam of our standards than, throwing open their gates, they streamed out, soldiers and citizens alike, to welcome Antony. Lucretius and Attius meanwhile tried to escape by leaping from the walls; but Attius was caught and brought back to Antonius, whereupon he requested to be sent to Caesar. Thus, on the same day as he had come, Antony was able to return with the surrendered battalions, taking Attius along with him. The troops Caesar incorporated with his own army; Attius he dismissed without penalty.

Three days had now passed before Pentima, spent by Caesar in strongly fortifying a camp, in collecting provisions from the neighbouring towns, and in awaiting the arrival of his remaining forces. Indeed, during these days he was joined, not only by the Eighth legion, but also by twenty-two battalions from the new levies in northern Italy, and some three hundred cavalry from the King of Noricum¹: reinforcements which enabled him to form a second camp on another side of the town, which he put under the charge of Curio. On the following days he commenced the circumvallation of the city with fortified lines of entrenchment; and the work

¹ Roughly Styria and Carinthia.

The Entanglement of Corfinium 17

on this was all but finished just as the messengers sent to Feb. 49 Pompeius got safely back.

As soon as Domitius had read the letter which they brought, 19 he determined to suppress the truth, and openly announced in a council of war that Pompeius was about to make a rapid march to their relief, exhorting his staff not to despair, but to make every preparation for the defence of the town. To a few intimate friends he divulged the real answer, and began to lay plans for escape. When it was seen, however, that his looks did not accord with his words, and that his whole manner betrayed more haste and nervousness than had been usual with him on previous days; and further that, contrary to his ordinary habit, he now held long and secret conversations with his friends for discussing their mutual plans, while he shrank from attending the councils of war and from the society of his brother-officers, the truth could no longer be hidden or disguised. This was that Pompeius had written back, flatly declining to court certain disaster; and intimating that, as Domitius had locked himself up in Pentima in opposition to his own plans and wishes, he must now take any opportunity that offered for rejoining him with all his forces. It was, of course, to prevent this very step, that Caesar was drawing his blockading lines around the city.

When the scheme of Domitius became generally known 20 amongst the troops in Pentima, they privately summoned an unauthorized gathering among themselves at dusk; and using as their mouthpiece one of their officers, together with the centurions and most influential of their own rank, expressed their decision as follows. 'They found themselves blockaded by Caesar, whose siege-works and fortifications were all but finished. Their own general Domitius, trust and confi-

Feb. 49 dence in whom had alone induced them to stay and hold the city, had thrown them all over and was now meditating flight : under these circumstances it was their duty to consult their own safety.' From this resolution the Marsi in the place at first strongly dissented, and seized upon what was considered the most strongly fortified quarter of the town. So bitter, indeed, grew the quarrel, that an attempt was made to come to blows and to fight it out with weapons ; but shortly afterwards the envoys who were dispatched by each party to the other enabled the Marsi to learn what they did not know before, viz. the contemplated flight of Domitius. When this was once known, the two forces joined hands, and fetching their general into the open, surrounded him with a guard. They then sent representatives of their own body to Caesar, with a message that they were prepared to open the gates, to obey his orders, and to deliver Domitius alive into his hands.

- 21 On receipt of these overtures, Caesar at once felt the extreme importance of taking possession of the town at the earliest possible opportunity, and of transferring the battalions in it to his own camp. There was always the chance of the garrison changing their minds, either through bribery, or the recovery of their spirits, or by false reports ; grave events in war being often determined by the slightest of accidents. On the other hand, there was also the fear that the entry of his troops at night might lead to excess and the looting of the town. Under these circumstances, therefore, he gave the envoys a cordial welcome, and then sent them back to their city ; whilst to his own men he issued orders closely to watch the gates and walls. He further stationed troops on the incompleting siege works, not, as on previous

days, at fixed intervals, but in one continuous line of sentries Feb. 49 and pickets, so that the men could touch hands with each other and thus cover the entire chain of works. Officers were sent round on tours of inspection, strictly charged, not only to guard against sallies by bodies of the enemy, but also to look out for any secret escape of individuals. That night not a man slept in camp, however careless or indifferent he might otherwise be; but engrossed as all were in the now rapidly approaching crisis, they continued to debate in their own minds the various aspects of the issue, as they wondered what would happen to the Pentimians, to Domitius, to Lentulus, and the rest, and what fate was in store for each group.

About six o'clock in the morning Lentulus Spinther hailed 22 our sentries and guards from the city wall, with the request that, if possible, he might be allowed an audience with Caesar. Leave being granted, he was sent out from the town under an armed escort of Domitius's troops, who took good care not to leave him until they had brought him safely into the presence of Caesar.

He began with an impassioned appeal for his own life, imploring Caesar to spare him, and reminding him of their longstanding friendship, and of Caesar's many kindnesses to himself—which indeed were considerable; including, as they did, his election to the pontifical college¹, his appointment to the province of Spain at the end of his praetorship, and support in his canvass for the consulship. Caesar interrupted his speech by telling him he had not left his province as a brigand, but to defend himself against the insults of his opponents, and to restore to their legal position tribunes of the people who had been driven from their country for daring to uphold his

¹ One of the great religious corporations.

Feb. 49 rights : in a word, to reassert the freedom both of himself and of the Roman people, at present ground down by the despotism of a clique. Reassured by such language, Lentulus asked leave to return to the town, intimating that his own successful petition would be a comfort and encouragement to others as well, some of whom were so panic-stricken as to be obliged to contemplate laying violent hands on their own persons. His request was granted, and he then withdrew.

23 At daybreak Caesar gave orders for all senators and their
 21 Feb. ¹ sons, as well as all officers and Roman knights, to be brought before him. Of the senatorial order there appeared five representatives, viz. Lucius Domitius, Publius Lentulus Spinther, Lucius Caecilius Rufus, Sextus Quintilius Varus (Domitius's paymaster), and Lucius Rubrius : the others included a son of Domitius, together with many other young lads, and a considerable number of knights and borough councillors, who had been ordered out for the campaign from the local towns by Domitius. Arrived in his presence, Caesar first placed them out of reach of the abuse and gibes of his own men, and then addressed them in a few curt phrases, seeing that they had not had the grace, on their side, to acknowledge his own extraordinary leniency towards themselves : after that he released them all without condition. A sum of about £50,000, which Domitius had taken with him into Pentima and there deposited in the city chest, was presently brought out by the four city magistrates. It was at once returned to Domitius by Caesar, who was determined men should not say he had shown more self-restraint in dealing with their lives than with their property ; although it was well known that this particular specie was in fact government money, re-

¹ According to Cicero.

ceived from Pompeius for the payment of the troops. Having Feb. 49 settled these preliminaries, he gave orders for Domitius's men to take the oath of military allegiance to himself; and then on the same day, striking camp, completed a full day's march, after a stay at Pentima of altogether one week. An advance through the districts of Ortona, Lanciano, Termoli, and Larino (the *Marrucini*, *Frentani*, and *Larinales*) brought him into Apulia.

To return to Pompeius. On intelligence of the operations 24 round Pentima, he had left Lucera (*Luceria*), and, marching through Canosa (*Canusium*), came down to Brindisi (*Brundisium*). The various contingents raised by the recent levy were ordered to concentrate upon this seaport from the different parts of the country; whilst, in addition, slaves and herdsmen were armed and mounted, till they made up a force of about three hundred horse. Lucius Manlius, one of the praetors, followed his leader in all haste with six battalions from Albe (*Alba*); whilst another praetor, Rutilius Lupus, brought three more from Terracina. Both these bodies came in sight of the distant cavalry of Caesar, commanded by Vibius Curius, and each, leaving the praetor to himself, went over to that officer. The same thing happened on the remaining stages of the march, some units falling in with Caesar's main column, others with his cavalry. In addition to this, the colonel commandant of engineers in the army of Pompeius, Numerius Magius of Cremona, was captured on the march, and conducted into the presence of Caesar. The latter at once sent him back to his own commander with the following message. 'Hitherto he had been refused the opportunity of an interview; but he was now coming to Brindisi (*Brundisium*), and it was of the most vital public interest that he should have

Feb. 49 a conference with Pompeius; for it was impossible to make the same progress by exchanging proposals through the medium of others, as by a personal discussion on all the points at issue.'

25 Soon after sending this message, he himself reached Brindisi at the head of six legions: three of these consisted of veterans, while the rest were composed of the recent levies, and had only been brought up to their full strength during the recent march. This represented all his force, since the surrendered army of Domitius had been sent straight away from Pentima (*Corfinium*) into Sicily. On arrival, he found that the two consuls had crossed to Durazzo (*Dyrrachium*) with the bulk of the Pompeian army, but that Pompeius himself was still at Brindisi with twenty battalions. It was impossible to discover whether the latter remained there for want of transports or whether his intention was to retain a hold on Brindisi, and to use this corner of Italy, with the opposite Greek coast, as a base for keeping command of the Adriatic; a course which would allow him to conduct hostilities simultaneously from either side. Fearing, however, that his opponent would not think it advisable to abandon Italy, Caesar determined to block the entrance to Brindisi harbour and render it impracticable for shipping. The method employed for this was as follows. Selecting the narrowest part of the harbour entrance, he built out from either shore, where the water was shallow, a sort of rough breakwater, carrying a broad level top. To this structure, as soon as the deeper water rendered further progress impossible, owing to the rubble no longer holding together, a couple of rafts were attached, each thirty feet square, one at either end, and made fast by four anchors from the four corners, so that no action of the waves could shift them. As soon as the first pair were completed and placed in

Plan of Brindisi. (Brundisium.)



A.A. Inner Harbour. **B.** Outer Harbour
C. Islands of St. Andrea. (Ancient Barra.)
D. Town. **E E.** Caesar's Moles.

To face p. 23.

position, others of similar dimensions were fastened in continuation, and over all a smooth surface of earth was laid, designed to give a free road to his men when charging to repel the enemy. Round the front and flanks of each raft were erected protection-hurdles and mantlets ; whilst every fourth raft carried a two-storied tower to aid in beating off the assaults of the enemy's ships, or his attempts to set fire to the work. March 49

To meet this device, Pompeius had recourse to a number of large merchantmen, which he had commandeered in Brindisi harbour. These vessels were specially fitted out by the erection on their decks of three-storied towers, armed with numerous pieces of artillery and every species of missile weapon. They were then driven against Caesar's works, with the object of breaking through the line of rafts and injuring the barricade ; and daily engagements between the two parties, though not indeed at close quarters, were carried on by means of slings, arrows, and other similar weapons. 26

These operations, though necessarily demanding Caesar's most careful attention, did not, however, as yet cause him to despair altogether of peace. It was true that the failure of Magius to return, after being expressly sent with communications to Pompeius, caused him considerable misgiving ; it was also true that his continued efforts in this direction gravely compromised his plans for taking military initiative : but notwithstanding all this, he felt himself bound to leave no stone unturned in the pursuit of his main object. He therefore dispatched one of his staff, Caninius Rebilus, a personal friend and relative of Scribonius Libo, with a commission to see that officer, and to beg him to exert his influence for peace. Above all, he requested a personal conference with Pompeius, and

March 49 again stated his firm conviction that if this could only be brought about, a peaceful solution, honourable to both parties, would be arrived at. Should this result be attained, most of the credit and reputation attaching to it would belong to Libo, whose active intervention would then have prevented a civil war. Libo went straight from this conversation with Caninius to Pompeius; only, however, to return with the message that, in the absence of the two consuls, no steps towards a settlement could be taken. With this last answer to efforts continually repeated, and repeated in vain, Caesar came to the reluctant conclusion that the time for such measures had now gone by, and that henceforward the war must be prosecuted with vigour.

- 27 The sea-mole he was building was about half finished, after nine days' work spent upon it, when the transports which had conveyed the van of the Pompeian army across to Durazzo (*Dyrrachium*) returned from the consuls, and safely entered Brindisi. Thereupon, whether it was that he became nervous at Caesar's blockading piers, or that his plan of campaign had all along been to let Italy go—at all events, with the arrival of these ships, Pompeius commenced preparations for evacuation. In order, however, to break the force of an attack from Caesar's troops, should the latter storm the town at the moment of withdrawal, he caused the city gates to be blocked up, barricaded the streets and thoroughfares of the town; whilst across the main arteries trenches were carried, bristling on the far side with sharp stakes and horizontally set piles, which were then carefully covered with light hurdles strewn with earth. All external approaches to the harbour, including two regular roads, were fenced off by driving into the ground enormous baulks carrying sharply-pointed heads;

and with these dispositions completed, orders were given for March 49
the legionaries to embark in silence ; whilst on the walls and
city towers was posted a thin line of light-armed troops,
drawn from the reservists, archers, and slingers. These last
were, at a prearranged signal, immediately the legionaries
were all on board, to fall back upon a conveniently sheltered
spot, where transports suitable for either sailing or rowing
lay ready to receive them.

Now, the people of Brindisi, instigated by what they had 28
suffered from the Pompeian soldiery, as well as by their
contemptuous treatment at the hands of Pompeius himself,
heartily espoused the cause of Caesar. As soon as the news,
therefore, leaked out of this decision to sail, under cover
of the confusion caused by the busy preparations of the
troops, signals were made on all sides from houses in the
town. Informed in this way of what was going forward,
Caesar ordered his men to prepare scaling-ladders and to
put on their arms, determined to lose no chance of striking
an effective blow. At nightfall, however, Pompeius sailed.
The guards left behind on the wall retired at the appointed
signal, and rushed down to the ships by paths well known
to themselves. Caesar's troops flung their ladders into
position, and swarmed up the walls ; but, warned by the
townspeople against the sunken ditches and fenced dykes,
they were forced to check their rush, and were then guided
round to the harbour by a more circuitous route. Here,
finding two of the transports with troops on board which
had run upon the mole, they hauled them off by row-boats
and launches, and then safely secured them as prisoners.

CHAPTER II

THE SAFEGUARDING OF THE WEST

29 WITH the escape of Pompeius an accomplished fact, the
 March 49 plan that most commended itself to Caesar for settling the
 business between them was to collect transports, and cross
 over after his opponent before the latter could strengthen
 his position by raising large bodies of oversea auxiliaries.
 The delay, however, and length of time involved in this
 course was a serious consideration ; for Pompeius, by requi-
 sitioning every ship on that part of the coast, had made
 immediate pursuit of himself impossible. The only alterna-
 tive was to wait for vessels to come from the somewhat
 distant regions of Northern Italy and Piceno (*Picenum*),
 or from the Sicilian Straits ; but this, owing to the un-
 favourable season of the year, appeared both a slow and
 precarious scheme. And, further, whilst he was waiting,
 the two Spanish provinces (one of which was devoted to
 the interests of Pompeius by reason of the great services he
 had rendered it), together with the veteran army stationed
 in them, would be steadily strengthened ; auxiliary forces and
 cavalry would continue to be raised ; and the allegiance of
 Gaul and Italy would be undermined, while he was out of the
 way ; none of which proceedings he was at all disposed to allow.

30 For the present, therefore, he gave up the idea of pur-
 suing Pompeius, and determined to transfer the war to
 Spain.¹ For this purpose orders were at once given to
 the governing magistrates of all municipal seaports to com-

¹ Caesar summed up the military situation by remarking that 'he went to an army without a general, and should return to a general without an army'. Suet. 35.

mandeer the required vessels, and have them brought round March 49
to Brindisi (*Brundisium*). With equal promptitude one of his staff, Valerius, was sent with a single legion to secure Sardinia; and Curio, with two legions and the powers of a governor, was similarly dispatched to Sicily, with orders to take his army over into Africa, immediately that island had been reduced. Sardinia was at the time held by Marcus Cotta, Sicily by Marcus Cato; whilst Tubero had been allotted Africa and was then due to take over the governorship. In Sardinia the people of Cagliari (*Carales*), as soon as they heard that Valerius was to be sent them, even before the expeditionary force had left Italy, of their own initiative expelled Cotta from the town; whereupon the Pompeian officer, frightened by the knowledge that the feeling of the province was unanimous, hastily quitted Sardinia for Africa. In Sicily Cato was busy repairing old men-of-war, and levying new ones from the various local communities; work into which he was throwing himself with extraordinary vigour. Special service officers had been sent to raise troops throughout Basilicata and Calabria (*Lucania* and *Bruttium*) from among those who held the Roman franchise; whilst in Sicily each township was required to furnish its fixed quota of horse and foot. These dispositions were all but completed when news reached the island of the approach of the rival governor Curio. Upon this report Cato summoned a general assembly, and in it openly denounced Pompeius for having deserted and betrayed his representative, and for having embarked on a war for which there had been no sort of necessity, without even the semblance of preparation; and that, in spite of the assurances publicly given in the Senate, in response to inquiries from himself and the rest, that

March 49 everything was fully prepared for hostilities. With this last public protest he took a hurried farewell of his province.

31 Thus it was that when Valerius and Curio arrived with their armed forces in Sardinia and Sicily respectively, they each found a province bereft of its constituted authorities. Tubero, on the other hand, on reaching Africa, found that province in the hands of Attius Varus, who was there engaged in exercising full military command. This general, after losing his battalions at Osimo (*Auximum*) under the circumstances already described, had completed his flight by taking the first ship for Africa; and, the country being at the time without a governor, had appointed himself to the command. Here he organized a levy and succeeded in raising two entire legions; his knowledge of the locality and its inhabitants, and his familiarity with the province, opening a way for such considerable designs; he having a few years previously governed this province at the close of his praetorship. Thus, when Tubero arrived with his ships off Utica¹, he found himself refused admission to either the harbour or town; not even his son, who was sick on board, was allowed to be landed, and he was obliged to weigh anchor and set sail from the neighbourhood.

32 This was the point events had reached when Caesar, being desirous of resting his men from their recent hard work before commencing further active operations, made a distribution of his present forces among the neighbouring Italian towns²,

1 April³ and then set out himself for the capital. Here having summoned the Senate, he made the House a statement of the wrongs he had suffered at the hands of his political

¹ In Tunis, not far from Bizerta. See Map, p. 95.

² Brindisi, Taranto, and Otranto (Cicero and Appian).

³ Cicero.

adversaries. He reminded members that it was no unconstitutional position he had sought; he had waited the legal time for re-election to the consulship, and had shown himself content with what was within the reach of every citizen alike. A proposal, allowing him to stand in his absence, had been submitted to the people by all the ten tribunes, and there carried in the teeth of the violent opposition of his opponents, particularly that of Cato, who had characteristically employed his favourite trick of talking out time each day the assembly had met. This measure, he reminded them, had been adopted in Pompeius's own consulship¹; why then, if the latter disapproved of it, did he allow it to be passed, or why, if he approved, had he prevented his (Caesar's) availing himself of the concession thus granted? He then asked the House to notice his own extraordinary forbearance in voluntarily proposing the disbandment of both armies, involving, as it would have done, a deliberate sacrifice of prestige and of his own legitimate position. He also exposed the bitter party-spirit betrayed by his antagonists, who did not hesitate to ask from another what they declined to do themselves; but sooner than yield up their command over standing armies preferred to plunge the whole world into war. The illegality of depriving him of the two legions was, moreover, openly denounced, along with the violent, high-handed action of curtailing the powers of the tribunate; nor did he omit to mention his own proposals for peace, and his repeated but thwarted attempts at an interview. 'Under these circumstances he urged and invited them to take up, and to retain the reins of government in conjunction

¹ 52 B. C. *Introd.*

April 49 with himself. Did, however, they shrink from co-operation with him, through fear of the consequences to themselves, he would not inflict himself upon them, but would carry on the administration alone. Meanwhile, he considered representatives should at once be sent to Pompeius with a view to a settlement ; for he felt no apprehension himself, like that lately uttered in the Senate by Pompeius, viz. that the opening of overtures by one party implied the recognition of the justice of the other party's claims, and a corresponding want of confidence in its own. That was but a weak and childish view of things. His own desire was to triumph by justice and equity, even as he had already sought to anticipate his opponent in action.²

- 33 The idea of opening negotiations with Pompeius commended itself to the House ; the difficulty was to find those willing to go. The chief reason for this general refusal to serve on such a commission was personal fear ; since Pompeius, on evacuating the capital, had openly declared in the Senate that he would regard all who stayed behind in Rome in the same category as those actually within Caesar's camp. The result of this threat was that three whole days were now wasted in wrangling and excuses. Moreover, the party opposed to Caesar put up Lucius Metellus to frustrate this proposal, and at the same time to block all other business which Caesar had designed. Perceiving his object, therefore, and reflecting that he had already spent several wasted days, when he was determined not to lose more time, Caesar left his proposed measures unfinished, and, taking his departure from the city, travelled through to Further Gaul¹.

¹ Modern France.